

The Court has seen by its order No. 13, (March 14) that I called for 500 friendly Creek Indians, to be commanded by Gen. Woodward, Majors Watson and Flournoy. The first two have been summoned here, on this, and another important point, but have not arrived. The third early fell in the Creek war. Col. Gadsden's deposition shows the importance of such force; and my predecessors in Florida have had the benefit of the suggestion. It was denied me by the agent of Government,

is reply, dated, respectively, March 28 and April 12. —
For the standing and qualifications of the two majors,
named by me to bring on the Indians, see Governor Ex-

sters of introduction. General Woodard is too highly distinguished, both as a commander of, and against, Indians, to require a word of support in this place; and it must be seen, in the agent's (Major Hogan's) letter to me, dated the 1st of February, that he thought he could, "in ten days, raise [me] 1000 warriors, and be on his march to join" [me].

9.—*Want of guides.*

Eastis and Lindsay, as shown by their testimony, had no competent guides, and could obtain none. Cluck's column was rather less badly provided in this respect.—It had not a guide who knew any thing of the intricacies of the *Cocac*—a Cretan labyrinth, held from the wedge of the white man, as the sacred groves of the

40 — *The limited time for police operations.*— From preceding causes, and deducting the time unnecessarily lost at Tampí, the columns of Clinch and Russ were actually in the field, beyond Fort Drane and a short ride, about twenty-two days.

could not wait to put the right wing in operation, from Port Drane farther than I did (the 20th of March) and, as usual, with the left wing, crossed the St. Johns, at Vicksburg, about the same time, to approach The Core, by the Little Back Bay. Caught in his wing, was compelled to return to Port Drane on the 25th of April, the term of service of a part of his volunteers having nearly expired, and, as he reports to me, the 27th—Men and horses much exhausted by sickness and the force of the weather. Another day's march would have necessitated the abandoning of a part of the train. Fifty horses and mules died on the road, and eight more

Eastie, with the left wing (which I accompanied from camp) was in like manner, and very much in the same condition, compelled to return to Volusia on the same day—April 24th.

The centre column, under Colonel Lindsay, which at last included Major Read's battalion, arrived by steam on Mobile, at Tampa, was the first of the three columns under my orders, in the field. On the 15th of

This column, consisting principally of the Alabama regiment of volunteers under Col. Chisholm, and several

the field, by a few days. By my orders No. 28, of the 16th of April, Col. Lindsay was instructed, on his return to Tampa, after my departure, to make any further movement, within the compass of his forces, in the execution of the campaign, that might be deemed useful, and then to cause the volunteers with him (the Alabama regiment and an independent company of Louisianians, under Captain Martin) to be embarked for their respective homes. That embarkation was commenced

men having set in," and it being deemed "impossible to keep the field with bodies of troops, without great cost for any object that could be accomplished, a waster of men and money,"

Thus terminated, Mr. President, active operations under my command; and if from the causes assigned, without blame or results, at least without defeat or check, as without dishonor.

In my report of the 12th of April, from Tampa, I spoke

which continued to the last to deserve greater praise than any other in the power of man, under my present circumstances, is to bestow. I also had the benefit of Colonel Gadsden's assistance, the chief of my staff, a volunteer in his person, a soldier and a patriot, who, independent of his personal knowledge of the enemy and the peninsula, of his services with me on and prior occasions, is endowed with talents and virtues which give him high claims upon the Government and country. The head of the

timidity or danger; and if, for and then, they yielded, they were just of their kind, it was purely in compliance to their countrymen fresh from civil life, who were cherished and assisted on every occasion. Those patriotic volunteers of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Louisiana, and Florida, were no doubt (many of them) sometimes inefficient from the mere awkwardness of inexperience; but they very generally brought with them to the war the qualities which always inspires the wish of men to

On the principal commanders and the troops which were under me, I have then only to invoke the approbation of their country. Let its course through this Court, fall on me, and me alone, of that army, it all were done which it was possible to accomplish under the circumstances.

A word, sir, as to my *plan of campaign*. I believe that this has been sufficiently developed in the evidence, and I have no more to say on that subject.

are themselves in print, as being somewhat European, as it were, were criminal to import professional knowledge, and to be the second to think that Generals ought to make war without plans of any sort. This *culgar error* has been accidentally but too signally rebuked by an eminent and entirely critic and political functionary, to be further noticed in this place. I shall, therefore, here simply quote the opinions of two younger, but better soldiers, on the same subject, as an illustration of a popular but low and narrow

After exploring the country to a great extent, and learning much that was new of it, and the enemy, Gen. Clinch says to me in his report (April 17th) of his operations returning from Tampa Bay, "that the true plan of operations against them [the Indians] will be that first designed by you, that is, by a force from Pelahatchie, a force ascending by my [late] route and a corresponding one on the north side, — his first route. This, to be forget will perceive, was the precise plan laid down

Q. Now, Capt. Threathon, who, I knew, in March, at Fort Drane, is not altogether approve of the plan of campaign I was about to follow, and with whom I did not again converse, is on the subject, was, when before this Court, at a venture, asked by me this question:

When I first heard General S. detail his operations, I thought that he had taken necessary precautions, by advancing into the country with three columns, from different points of the peninsula, not doubting that our wing [Cliché's] of the army would be met by the enemy in force on the Wythiaconce. Nor did I believe that a nation of 5,000 people could conceal itself so effectually in the peninsula, south and east of the Wythiaconce, that they could not be met.

But, Mr. President, it has been objected to me that, in my first operations, (towards Tampa Bay,) I held the